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Abstract DBSy (Domain Based Security) is being used more and more
for the identiﬁcation, analysis and documentation of security issues in en-
terprise CIS (Communication & Information Systems) projects particularly
in the military domain. The methodology incorporates numerous security
related activities in the early stages of the systems lifecycle to aid in the
speciﬁcation of high-level, technology independent security functionality so-
lutions.
This report focuses on research carried out into improving practices within
the DBSy user community with particular emphasis on:
• Applicability and indeed advantages of using DBSy to model: mobile,
autonomous and ad-hoc CIS from a business processes perspective
• Ranking risks1 according to an appropriate value system
• Modeling business connections in an extensible manner
The IFPA (Indirect Fire Precision Attack) and CVF (Future Carrier) projects
were used as case studies, in order to identify the extent to which DBSy sup-
ports the modelling of the aforementioned concepts. Section 1 introduces
the signiﬁcance of DBSy and the reasons for its use in military enterprise
projects such as IFPA & CVF, section 2 then highlights limitations identi-
ﬁed in the current speciﬁcations of DBSy and how it maybe advantageous
to build upon the current speciﬁcations. Section 3 discusses solutions pro-
posed in order to overcome the limitations identiﬁed in section 2. Section 4
illustrates the usefulness of the proposed solutions in terms of IFPA & CVF
with section 5 containing the ﬁndings from this research.
Key Words: Autonomous Systems, Business Connections & Rank-
ing Risks
∗Sponsored by BAE SYSTEMS Integrated System Technologies, Security Research
Group, Frimley, Camberley, Surrey GU16 7EX, UK
1The terms risk and compromise path will be used interchangeably throughout this
report
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1 Introduction
From our experiences of applying DBSy to various infosec projects it has
been found to be a highly intuitive and ﬂexible methodology, providing de-
signers and accreditors with the required information to assess security from
a cost-beneﬁt point of view. Such cost-beneﬁts assessment may not be di-
rectly ﬁnancial instead relating to user experience and the agility of the
processes in place to enable the business and allow it to react eﬀectively to
changing circumstances.
Most modern military CIS are procured under increasingly demanding
time and cost restrictions. These restrictions combined with requirements
to integrate new and existing systems providing NEC (Network Enabled Ca-
pability) have exacerbated the need to provision for security from an early
stage ideally from the initial feasibility phase. Early consideration of security
provides a better understanding of the security issues ultimately providing
a more eﬀective solution meeting the requirements with lower associated
costs.
Due to its integrated and systematic approach for identifying, analysing
and documenting security issues at an early stage DBSy has been used to
specify security functionality from a technology independent point-of-view
in both IFPA & CVF.
Mobile and autonomous CIS allow ﬂexible and sophisticated modes of
operation, which are increasingly necessary for businesses to eﬃciently, ful-
ﬁl their requirements. Such systems also introduce ad-hoc communications,
which need to be securely managed. Together mobile & autonomous CIS
and the ad-hoc communications they utilise present signiﬁcant security chal-
lenges. It is therefore important for DBSy to be able to model such issues
if it is to eﬀectively analyse enterprise CIS architectures for military and
non-military business.
In order to successfully minimise potential risks it is important to gain an
understanding of their severity relevant to one another, DBSy must therefore
facilitate such a requirement. Many businesses also require specialised con-
nection types for communications between business processes DBSy must
therefore provide an extensible mechanism to model such connections.
2 Perceived Limitations in DBSy Speciﬁcations
Due to the relative novelty of DBSy it has not been fully tested through
application to real life projects. In our modelling of IFPA we encountered
the problem of describing an autonomous system, which is also mobile and
requires ad-hoc communications with other physically distributed systems.
Current speciﬁcations of DBSy do not identify how to model such behaviour.
Although it has been found that DBSy does not explicitly support the
modelling of mobile, ad-hoc and autonomous systems, the advantages of
providing such techniques have also been investigated. DBSy unlike most
other modelling tools illustrates the maximum allowed connectivity between
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various business processes. Although the explicit representation of mobile
processes and ad-hoc communications would provide a more complete repre-
sentation of an architecture this cannot be seen to enhance the understand-
ing of security issues. As all processes (static or mobile) and communications
(permanent or ad-hoc) must be explicitly deﬁned in a uniform manner, en-
suring that the superset of all such processes and their connections are fully
speciﬁed.
Due to the limited usefulness of explicitly modelling mobile CIS and
ad-hoc communications it was decided to concentrate on developing mecha-
nisms for the description of autonomous CIS. However as previously stated
no technique within DBSy currently exists to model autonomous systems.
Features from the speciﬁcations [4] most closely aligned to modelling au-
tonomous systems are sensors2, eﬀectors3 and business domains4. A tradi-
tional business domain is restricted to representing a logical group of people
who may collaborate and share information relatively freely and sensors &
eﬀectors do not permit explicit valuation. These limitations mean the cur-
rent speciﬁcations do not satisfy our requirements for modelling autonomous
business processes in IFPA, where we have a unique business process of a
deﬁned value (protective marking & criticality level) which does not explic-
itly represent any logical grouping of people, instead autonomously aiming
to achieve the dynamic goals of people in business domain(s).
There is currently no speciﬁcation for the systematic ranking of risks
within DBSy. Such an approach would aid in reporting risks in a more
meaningful and concise manner thus allowing for resources to be concen-
trated into those risks perceived to be of greatest threat according to the
ranking mechanism. This is particularly signiﬁcant in larger projects such
as CVF, where the security analyst can be swamped by the vast number of
potential risks with no sense of their relative signiﬁcance.
The speciﬁc nature of certain projects means the business connections
between various processes are not adequately modelled using the standard
connection types, which are part of the current DBSy speciﬁcation. A more
generic method for expressing connection types is therefore required this was
highlighted in our modelling of IFPA, where we require a messaging connec-
tion between an autonomous business process and person(s) with whom it
may communicate. This is contrary to the current standard messaging con-
nection type which is deﬁned for communications between people in business
domains only.
2A sensor is deﬁned as: Connects an environment to a domain, enabling information
to be collected from the environment.
3Eﬀectors have various deﬁnitions depending on its instance for example a printer is
described as: Connects a domain to an environment, enabling information to be printed.
4A business domain represents the logical places where people work and exchange data
by means of software acting on their behalf.
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3 Proposed Improvements to DBSy Speciﬁcations
The discussions in sections 1 and 2 suggest the concept of autonomy must
be addressed, enabling accurate modelling of the envisaged CIS architecture
for IFPA, thus providing a valuable insight into the security implications
involved. Abstractly an autonomous system can be described as some com-
bination of integrated sensing and eﬀecting capability. Such systems may
react to sensed data in a semi-automatic manner, using pre-deﬁned or real-
time5 decision rules upon which to base eﬀecting actions.
The ABD (Autonomous Business Domain) construct has been devised to
model autonomous processes in DBSy, its graphical representation is given
in ﬁgure 1. Its speciﬁcation can be summarised as: A logical computing and
communication base, which may accumulate, transmit and process data. An
ABD must:
• Be hosted upon an island of infrastructure
• Connect to: environment(s) via sensors and/or eﬀectors and business
domain(s) via business connection(s)
• Have a unique identiﬁer within an infosec business model
• Have an appropriate valuation such as protective marking as well as
codes and caveats as necessary
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the ABD business process construct.
Due to the generic nature of its speciﬁcation the ABD is applicable in a
wide range of instances particularly military, due to the increasing number
of CIS projects requiring autonomous capability such as guided munitions,
unmanned underwater vehicles, smart mines etc. The potentially sensitive
nature of the business carried out by ABDs suggests they must be hosted
upon island(s) of infrastructure, highlighting the need for well deﬁned and
secure points of communication with other processes.
From the speciﬁcation of an ABD it is proposed to label ABDs with
protective marking and codes & caveats. Therefore ABDs can be analysed
as a point of attack (in the compromise step analysis stage) just as any
other important business process in DBSy such as conventional business do-
mains. This aids in the identiﬁcation of risks associated with such processes.
5Real-time decisions maybe from a human user operating in business domain(s), e.g.
MITL (Man-In-The-Loop)
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For example mobile code can give attackers the opportunity to re-conﬁgure
autonomous processes to react to authorised or un-authorised instructions
(e.g. command & control) in malicious or un-intended ways. Potential at-
tacks may vary from the leakage of conﬁdential data to integrity and even
denial-of-service.
The compromise path analysis technique currently speciﬁed in DBSy to
identify potential risks maybe used in conjunction with an appropriate value
system to rank risks. An overview of the process proposed to identify and
rank risks is given below and summarised in ﬁgure 2.
1. Deﬁne an infosec architecture model
2. Carry out compromise step analysis on the infosec architecture model
3. Identify compromise paths
4. 6 Carry out HMG IS3 (Her Majesty’s Government Infosec Standard
3) connection level calculations for each compromise path identiﬁed in
step 3
5. List individual compromise paths in order of severity according to
HMG IS3 connection levels calculated in step 4
In order to calculate the HMG IS3 connection level for individual com-
promise paths7 it is suggested to take into account the diﬀerence in protec-
tive marking, codes and caveats of both the attacker and victim domains.
Figure 2: Overview of proposed threat analysis technique.
It is suggested non-standard business connection instances are referenced
by a unique identiﬁer, this is illustrated in further detail in section 4. Such
an approach would aid in the modelling of non-standard business connec-
tions, as well as providing potentially useful security information, due to the
sensitivities of speciﬁc connection types and the data they transmit.
6This step (4) maybe replaced by any valuation scheme of relevance to the project being
undertaken, the example given is for UK (United Kingdom) MoD (Ministry of Defence)
projects.
7Such a path maybe a direct or indirect connection in terms of the infosec business
model (developed as part of the infosec architecture model), however this is not relevant
in the current context.
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4 Application of Improvements
The example infosec architecture model illustrated in ﬁgure 3 highlights the
use of an ABD with table 1 showing the use of a referencing table to describe
non-standard business connections. It can be seen how an ABD may use
sensors and eﬀectors as well as other business connections to enable it in
carrying out its required business. From table 2 it can be seen how risks can
be ranked according to an appropriate value system8.
The ranking of compromise paths9 according to their severity is sug-
gested as a suitable risk ranking mechanism. Deriving risks according to
a mechanism such as that illustrated in ﬁgure 2 would also prove inexpen-
sive, as most of the steps shown are likely to already be carried out in the
majority of projects which utilise DBSy.
Figure 3: Illustrates the use of the ABD component and referencing of non-
standard business connections.
Connection Id Connection Description
1 Logistics Messaging
2 Imaging & Temperature Information
3 Mission Speciﬁc Messaging
Table 1: Deﬁnes each non-standard connection for the example infosec ar-
chitecture in ﬁgure 3.
8HMG IS3 using only protective markings was used in the example given in table 2.
9If a series of compromise steps from a potential attacker to a victim process consist
solely of soft security functions this is deﬁned as a compromise path. There are two
distinct risk types, which are classiﬁed according to the direction of the data ﬂow, these
are:
- Conﬁdentiality risks whereby data ﬂows from the victim to the attacker process
- Integrity & Availability risks whereby data ﬂows from the attacker to the victim
process
6UNCLASSIFIED
From a detailed threat analysis carried out using in house software devel-
oped previously, three compromise paths have been identiﬁed. These paths
can also be identiﬁed from ﬁgure 4. The risks are as follows:
• Attacker:A - Victim:B (Risk T)
• Attacker:Z - Victim:A (Risk U)
• Attacker:B - Victim:A (Risk V)
Figure 4: Illustrates the compromise paths of the infosec architecture in
ﬁgure 3.
It must be noted that an indirect compromise path also exists whereby
process Z is the attacker and process B is the victim via process A, however
it has not been explicitly identiﬁed as the individual risks U and V can be
seen to encompass this risk.
Risk HMG IS3 Level Ranking
T 1 2
U 2 1
V 1 =2
Table 2: Ranking of risks for the example infosec architecture in ﬁgure 3.
Although the ranking mechanism outlined does not explicitly express
the type of risk (i.e. Conﬁdentiality, Integrity or Availability) this can be
identiﬁed from the compromise step analysis stage.
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5 Conclusions
Experience in applying DBSy to the IFPA and CVF projects has shown it
to be a ﬂexible and indeed eﬀective methodology for the identiﬁcation, anal-
ysis and documentation of security issues in infosec architectures. However
due to its relative novelty as well as its broad appeal it has been shown
that individual user communities such as the military will have to adapt the
methodology for their needs, building on the fundamental building blocks
towards more comprehensive techniques.
The issues of mobile systems and ad-hoc communications have been
found to not require speciﬁc adaptation as this would add little to the use-
fulness of the methodology in security terms. However autonomous systems
such as those proposed in IFPA have been found to require innovation by
the user community in order to leverage the advantages of DBSy.
The ranking of potential risks has been identiﬁed as a valuable procedure
providing useful information to analysts and developers of systems, for the
purposes of concentrating scarce resources according to the potential sever-
ity of risks. Such a ranking mechanism would aid in large projects such as
CVF particularly where the number of risks are numerous proving diﬃcult
to identify the relative severity of risks.
The modelling of specialised business connection types allows for a more
intuitive description of the communications between business processes as
well as, giving a more comprehensive insight into potential security impli-
cations due to the nature of the data in transit. This was highlighted from
our work on IFPA where it was necessary to specify business connections
currently unavailable in the standard template.
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